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Interview with Rafael Cubillán Betancourt


Rafael Cubillán Betancourt
President of La Mundial de Seguros, Venezuela
Name:: Rafael Cubillan Betancourt
Studies: Lawer, Universidad Católica Andrés Bello (1962)
Postgraduate studies in Insurance, College of Insurance of New York (1963-1964)
Several Courses, Swiss Insurance Training, Zurich (1976)
Professional career:
  • Former Professor in “Trade Law”, Universidad Católica Andrés Bello
  • Former President of the Chamber of Insurers and the National Insurance Board (twice)
  • Vice President of the Venezuelan Association of Insurance Producers (1964-1974)
  • CEO Seguros La Unión (1974 - 1984)
  • CEO La General Seguros (1984 - 1988)
  • CEO Seguros Mercantil (1988 - Today)
  • Insurance Consultant (currently)
  • President of the Board of Directors of La Mundial de Seguros, Venezuela (currently)

1. In your long working career, what was your first experience in the bonding area?

Many years ago, during the early 70s, I was entrusted with a general management position in an insurance company in which foreign shareholders participated. At that time, Venezuela was heading towards a strong development in government investment in the construction of roads, harbors, airports, and in the provision of water and electricity by establishing important electric and hydroelectric networks across the country. There was also a plan to continue construction projects that had been paused short after the change of government. When the government of general Pérez Giménez was replaced by Venezuelan democracy, the State bodies -who were the main investment players- felt the need to find a traditional and known mechanism: to have a collateral in case of default by that large number of constructors, suppliers and designers; request for bid bonds therefore increased as a result of the State's call for bids from suppliers.

This made us consider the bond industry as an extremely important line, not only due to what the bond business itself generated, but also because it served as a bridge to seize related activities of those debtors, those constructors, those suppliers, in other of their insurance needs. The construction risk, the machinery risk and the risk of transporting equipment became so important that they ended up representing a very high average in the insurance industry profile and in the insurance activity in Venezuela. Thus, bonding became a business as well as an integral service mechanism for the bond applicant, so that all protections required by their other activities were centered in their bond provider. That first experience was valid for many years. I believe it is still part of the bond line vital reason and it is much required by the sector's activity, by the service provider's activity. I would like to mention that in Venezuela, in contrast with other countries, the State is the main development provider and the one that has demanded, abiding by their procurement schemes, the presentation of bonds to guarantee results.

2. In Venezuela's bonding history, the avals' crisis is well remembered. In your own opinion, what happened? What is the lesson the market learnt from it?

The avals' crisis (in whose final stage I participated) consisted in a deviation in the management of the so-called bond line, because performance, advance payment and good quality bonds, amongst others, were replaced by simply guaranteeing the credits and loans that constructors or service or equipment suppliers required from banks. During the previous years this business had had an extremely high rate of performance -that is to say, there were no defaults-, so banks understood that it would be a good business to expand their operations and to ensure payments. Insurance companies understood that it would be a good business to guarantee the existing insurance debts to banks. When the government system changed and democracy was installed, public constructions were halted for some time. Big obligors, major work and service providers found themselves in really uncomfortable financial situations. The lack of activity delayed the constructions due to the modification of the State's paying scheme.

In consequence, many of those businesses began to freeze their operations and some even incurred in arrears and subsequent bankruptcy, leading banks, which had avals and payment collaterals issued by insurance companies, to call on those bonds and avals. And banks proceeded in an implacable manner; there was practically no room for negotiations. This brought as a consequence the bankruptcy -to say it in very realistic terms- of La Nacional, the largest insurance company in Venezuela at the time and also the disappearance of three or four important insurance companies. This led practically the whole insurance market to an unbalanced financial situation.

With the reinsurers´ support, once the claims on avals had been canceled, there came a very interesting stage that lasted many years and of which some remains still last. I am talking about the recovery process that insurance companies went through over the assets that obligors might have kept, especially those related to real estates, properties, land and buildings. Even many years later, some recoveries still occurred for those companies that had been in crisis due to the avals. The lesson insurance companies learnt was not to issue any more avals. They unanimously and somehow indisputably decided that, from then on, they would not open their operations to include credit avals.

Obviously, this position was discussed and agreed upon with reinsurers. A common front was created so that, from then on, the bonding activity would be solely directed towards the concepts that should not have been changed: to insure performance, quality, good usage of advance payment, timely delivery of the works, but always apart from the concept of financing of credit and cash payments on determined dates, what we call financial collateral today. This was also taken by the State as a kind of unwritten agreement with insurance companies and a protection was later incorporated in the legislation. By preventing the insurance industry from granting financial collaterals, it simply protected domestic users of insurance products, the ordinary citizen that purchases a car or accident policy, because their insurer was not risking their own financial and property stability by underwriting financial guarantees. Thus, a higher level of economic security and creditworthiness for sureties was achieved.

Would this, then, have anything to do with the inclusion of the prohibition for insurance companies to issue financial collaterals in the 1974 Law?

The avals crisis started precisely when the government of general Pérez Giménez ended and it extended, from the point of view of the payment to obligees, to 1967-68. This is why I think it might have influenced the Law, with no doubt. The prohibition starts for the reinsurance treaties. Reinsurers immediately withdrew their support to the granting of avals. This is why I said that, in a non-contractual but agreed way from the point of view of financial security, the State accepted and encouraged -for the financial health of the insurance activities- the exclusion of avals, and literally incorporated the prohibition in its legislation.

3. Why is it in your opinion that in our country there is a greater tendency to seek bonds from insurers rather than from banks?

That has, in my opinion, several aspects. Speed of response: the insurance sector is much more willing to study and analyze a bond application than banks. Firstly because it has a reinsurance protection that gives -from a professional point of view-a support that is enriched by experience and that allows higher speed in the granting of bonds. Secondly, the price; banks, for their own reasons, have a cost for issuing bonds that is much higher than in the insurance sector, not only because of the distribution in terms of reinsurance, but also because of the legal obligations, such as, the constitution of a counterpart for the total amount of the issued bond in their balance sheet. In the insurance activity, reinsurance makes it possible to subtract the amount reinsured from the balance sheet, provided the corresponding reinsurer is duly registered and authorized by the Superintendence of Insurance Activity in Venezuela. That helped the insurance sector take over practically all bonds for public agencies. This does not mean that banks do not do issue bonds, they do it for lower and more restricted volumes.

Don't you think this is influenced by type of collateral requested by banks? In addition, there are legal limitations on their possibility of undertaking commitments and this is closely linked to the size of their capital or their assets.

Without reinsurance, there is a hundred per cent obligation. The insurance industry has that advantage that derives from its own nature, where a reinsurer (whose assets, due to its international dimension, are at times as big as or even bigger than banks) is probably much more creditworthy than the cedent company. Banks are much more limited in granting bonds because their obligation is total.

With regard to counter-guarantees, banks are not used to dealing with the concept of risk. This is a great difference between the banker and the insurer. The insurer is trained to mold the risk, to "caress" it, to wait for it and to be prepared to face it when the event occurs. This is not the case with the banker. The banker is simply a deposit administrator. Their moral commitment towards the depositor implies calling on all necessary actions to ensure that the depositor's collateral will never be deviated from the management of those assets. Banks are therefore forced to close all loss options and have a collateral requirement of practically 1 x 1, and, even better, 2 x 1, to cover expenses. But the difference lies in the fact that the banker runs no risks.

4. In your opinion why is it that this product has not been demanded by the private sector?

I think that, in Venezuela, we do not have a private sector that promotes development. The Venezuelan private sector, when engaged in operations amongst private parties, has a broad enough capacity and experience to contract providers -be them works, services or goods providers- that inspire the needed trust so as not to request bonds from them. During the last few years, however, bonds have started to be demanded in the case of contracts amongst private parties. Nevertheless, one must conclude that the only provider of works or service and supply contracts in Venezuela has been the State. When analyzing Venezuela's bonding history, you see that 90% of the contracts are done by the State. Then, the State, for its own reasons -amongst them the Protection of Public Assets Law- establishes requirements and conditions that force the furnishing of bonds.

5. When investigating into the characteristics of bonds, we find that first demand is one of the conditions in many countries. This is not so in Venezuela. In your opinion, why is it that we have this advantage?

This has been a long fight from which the insurance industry always came out victorious arguing that, in the case of a construction covered by a bond, the obligee cannot wait for the debtor to comply, and, if the oblige understands that there is no compliance, simply require payment of the economic part and leave the surety and the debtor agree on what first demand implies. A bond is a contract; ethics requires both parties to comply with their commitments and carry out all actions. The obligee must notify delays, construction defects and any other thing that may imply a possibility of default so that the surety may intercede and not simply turn into the issuer of a check upon default. With the first demand, we would be attacking a culture of respect, responsibility towards the activity and the functions of each of the parties. The insurance industry has upheld that first demand implies waiving the unavoidable right of the debtor also having to comply with their obligations to society and not becoming an obligee that receives payment upon first demand, in order to abide by the social commitment in which all of us have responsibilities, rights and duties. That is my interpretation, and with that argument we have managed to make the first demand nonexistent in Venezuela. In addition, if the insurance sector accepts and issues on-demand bonds, it waives the right of defense, the right to search for the truth, and the recovery actions would go against it.

6. What do you attribute the increase in losses during these last two years to?

To improvisation, because it is only by walking a long path that one can become a creditworthy constructor in the execution of works, or an equipment or service provider that ensures an adequate satisfaction and an impeccable performance. The scenario has undergone very important changes as to who are the providers of goods and services. When one works with a traditional provider that has been fulfilling their commitments adequately for thirty, forty or fifty years, there is a great tendency to maintain that relation, because in some way one takes into consideration that provider's proven experience.

This has to do with underwriting. During my years as a bond underwriter, there was a rule that we would apply every time there was a change in government: restrict or reinforce underwriting, for a great number of new companies began to appear, and great caution was taken when underwriting bonds for companies that, in some way, belonged to the previous government. If there were political continuity in the State's works -regardless of the political party in government-, there wouldn't be so many problems, because all players would have their experience and quality recognized. But, when there are changes and -in our case- a profound change of national perspective, players change in some way for contextual and practical reasons; many inexperienced players appear, traditional contractual rules are not abided by and defaults occur that would otherwise not have occurred. This is the consequence of losing, up to a certain point, the experience previously gained in handling contracts. Moreover, in cases of emergency, when there are no calls for tenders for the granting of contracts, the insurance company wonders whether the company selected will have the skills and capabilities required for carrying out the project. This causes a huge number of problems, such as subcontracting, which we have frequently seen. If the debtor does not have the capacity, why not seek a provider that does? This marks the beginning of the increase in the work's costs, distribution of results and extension of deadlines, and of problems.

7. What are the measures you think insurance companies and other institutions should take?

The most important issue is underwriting. Underwriting a bond requires experience, because it is easy to have the book and the checklist. But very little will be done if the experience needed to make the adequate decisions regarding the acceptance or rejection of bond applications. I think that, just like in all other activities, you do not learn by a spontaneous generation but by transmission of that subjective element of underwriting -that is perhaps the most important one- from those who already have the experience to the newcomers who still do not have it.

Books tell you about the assets, the equipment, the contracts, a number of issues that are very subjective and refer to the history and performance record of the bond applicant. There must be a record of works satisfactorily completed for the underwriting analysis to include the element that ensures good results. This leads to something I have said before, because, being the insurance industry active in bonding, there are two types of reactions: those regarding claims and those regarding losses. When there is a fire claim because a shop was struck by lightning and burnt or a transport claim because a gondola was overturned and its shipment disappeared, the risk underwriter takes it simply as an event for which they were prepared, because that is why the fire or transport policy is issued.

However, when a bond claim occurs, the bond underwriter starts suffering because he feels that claim should not have existed. His link to underwriting is too emotional, and the claim makes him feel an anguish that should not be felt, but it is so. Then, his level of suffering is too high because he is very involved in the underwriting, there is a subjective element. In the case of fire or transport, an external random fact produces the harm. In the case of bonds -even though this does not necessarily apply to all bonds- the subjective element has a great importance. So, I conclude that the issue is the underwriting.

Don't you think there should be more control by the regulator?

Personally, I prefer as little intervention as possible in all activities. As more efforts are done towards the strengthening of values, devotion, respect and solidarity, the less need there is for authority intervention, control and penalties. Unfortunately, the world has changed. If we review history, in the insurance activity there used to be an expression of commitment called "provisional coverage", which was granted over the telephone, and which has come to an end for reasons we all know: "If you do not put it in writing and sign it, I have no coverage". Simply put, those expressions are the result of the diverted evolution of social behavior or commercial conduct.

8. What do you think of the new insurance activity law in terms of bonds?

I am not very familiar with the new insurance law in terms of bonds, because it has somehow maintained the previous rules, except for the one related to the granting of bonds limited by client to the insurance company's paid in capital. The insurance superintendent made a very accurate interpretation, safeguarding the activity; in some way, telling those who wrote the law that they totally forgot about the existence -in the case of bonds (I do not know about other lines)- of that which is intrinsic to insurance, i.e. reinsurance. Insurance is probably (and certainly to a larger extent than banking) the only human activity that has settled a network, a universal web. For instance, a laboratory produces a drug, sells it and that is all; it is limited to one, two or three markets. Insurance, however, due to the requirement to spread the risk, throughout its many years of development, has led to the global participation of players in the risk. If you insure the bridge over the Maracaibo Lake, probably, to say it in colloquial terms, half of the first stilt is insured or covered by African, Australian or Russian reinsurers, and the other half by others. What I mean to show is that the superintendent understood that reinsurance is the umbrella that allows the insurance activity to exist in the whole world, in its catastrophic exposures as well as in large risks, because an earthquake or any of nature's catastrophic manifestations, is not possible without reinsurance. The same thing happens with bonds, which can have catastrophic consequences if for any reason there is a debacle at any given time: With a protection of this kind, the continuity of the activity is therefore ensured.

This situation has led to a series of consultations by the industry to the regulator, in order to present their position. The work of the Chamber through the Bond Advisory Committee, the opportunity to raise the issue at the international insurance meeting and explain the consequences, finally arouse the concern of the legislator and, some days ago, there was an article on the press mentioning the modification to this limitation in the law ruling insurance.

This shows that where there is dialogue results are obtained, except when you stumble upon a government's political wall. At the end of the day, I believe that the process is slow because it cannot be handled in a fast way, plus the difficulties of moving into a system that is not our traditional one.

9. How do you see the market and the bond business in Venezuela in the short run?

Without any change. I think the volume of operations and public projects will continue to decrease, except for specific needs that might arise. In this moment, bonds are going through a difficult period. In this country, the promoter of works is the State, which is now centralized and has been decreasing its public activity. Bonds will continue to be contracted.

10. Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to ask you about the development and the projection of credit insurance in our country.

I think that credit insurance in Venezuela is recognized. La Mundial de Seguros has started an important campaign of presentations at different commercial and industrial chambers, at insurance intermediaries, though some advertising that help the country to know about our existence and the existence of this product. This is already being reflected in a positive development of credit insurance, because, in some way, it brings tranquility to the industries, the goods distributors, manufacturers in general and to all those who have an important business and wish to increase their level of economic tranquility by relying on an organization that is alert to any delay in the payment of invoices, not in the sense of persecution but in the sense of a call of attention to take corrective measures and help maintain commercial links. Today the commercial and industrial Venezuelan markets are more aware of this offer, which brings and supports economic tranquility.

Interviewed by Gipsy Chafardet, Americana de Reaseguros SA, Caracas, Venezuela. Octubre 2011

Av. Santa Fe 830, Piso 7 I C1059ABP Buenos Aires - Argentina

Phone: 54-11-5032-8375

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